America and the World After Bush: 12 Step Recovery Plan
James Joyner | January 20, 2009
As I write this, Barack Obama is minutes away from taking the oath of office as president of the United States. It's a fitting time, then, for an overview of the foreign policy challenges and opportunities ahead.
Let's continue our look at Thomas Barnett's forthcoming book, America and the World After Bush, with Chapter Two: A Twelve-Step Recovery Program for American Grand Strategy.
1. Admit that we Americans are powerless over globalization. Barnett uses the analogy of a general contractor, who subcontracts "the lower-end jobs to the most competent, entry-level providers." We should quit trying to prevent the natural flow of simple manufacturing jobs to the developing world and the demand of immigrants who want to do wage labor from crossing our borders. We should instead embrace these trends and remember that "demand determines power far more than supply."
2. Come to believe that only a bipartisanship far greater than that displayed by most national leaders can restore sanity to America's foreign affairs. Barnett argues that the reign of the Baby Boom generation has been disastrous for our politics and that it's time to pass the torch. We need a "comprehensive and thus centering middle-class consensus on issues like globalization and overseas military interventions."
3. Make the decision to coordinate all elements of America's national power according to a grand strategy that we have collectively defined. We should supersize the Bush administraton's laudable reinvestment in development of the Gap nations but he's skeptical that the State Department is the right vehicle for this. He also believes the intelligence community, with its "collective cult of dysfunctional secrecy" is largely outmoded. We should radically shift defense spending away from heavy forces into those who can fill the SysAdmin missions of COIN, SASO, and the like.
4. Make a searching and fearless moral inventory of the "Global War on Terror." Barnett is pleased with our progress in killing al Qaeda's leaders and weakening that organization generally but contends "America's efforts to date have made us safer at the expense of allies in Europe, Asia, and Africa" because the terrorists have shifted their focus to softer targets there. Thus, we've made "no strategic headway" while "effectively isolating America from the world."
"We've got to get better at defining both enemies and allies," realizing that "Not every Muslim is an Islamist is a fundamentalist is a jihadist." Barnett believes "our definition of progress must inevitably broaden beyond simply 'killing weeds' to 'growing some lawn.'" Specifically, we should shift our focus on expanding globalization and economic progress, which will empower women and otherwise weaken the power of radicals. Sadly, the killing isn't going to stop any time soon; indeed, it'll likely get worse before it gets better, as the radicals struggle to avoid being trampled by modernity.
While it will be difficult to sustain our will politically with little obvious progress, the demographic trends are on our side. Within the next quarter century, the Middle East will "middle-age," meaning fewer young radicals to foment violence. Meanwhile, he predicts, Islamist parties will emerge in Western Europe and Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia will present alternative models of success for Islamic states.
5. Admit to the world and to ourselves the exact nature of our mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Barnett's an outlier here, arguing that Afghanistan is actually a peripheral mission that matters little and that we should redouble our efforts at fixing Iraq. He believes strongly that Big Bang strategy for shaking up the region by toppling Saddam was the right move and that the mistake was in not doing the postwar right.
6. We are entirely ready to work with the international community to remove these defects of wartime injustice. America has made a grave mistake in rejecting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which would have been a far more suitable venue than Guantanamo for dealing with illegal combatants. Reverse that and set a precedent that American troops can act as global cops to root out bad guys and turn them over to the international courts for justice.
7. Humbly ask the incoming president to reverse America's unilateralism. The Bush administration largely corrected its mistakes on this front in the second term but a new administration provides a chance to make a clean break. America must set the example for following the rules because the rules are ultimately of our own making and enforcing them broadly is to our own advantage.
8. Make a list of all the great powers whose national interests we have harmed, and become willing to make concessions to them all. We must recognize that regional powers have interests and respect that fact. In turn, we can work with them to address our own interests in their spheres of influence.
9. Make direct overtures to violent nonstate actors whenever possible, except when doing so would damage existing alliances. The tagline here is misleading. Barnett argues that we tend to take the worse-case view of the impact of the spread of technology when, in fact, it almost always creates more opportunity than danger. Connectivity breeds trust which breeds peace.
10. Continue to review our goal of accelerated democratization, and when we are wrong in our strategic approach promptly admit it. We need to take a longer view on democracy and globalization, helping them along where we can rather than trying to force them. "Feed stomachs and wallets first, then hearts and minds will follow."
11. Seek to create strategic alliances with rising powers through diplomatic linkages and military-to-military cooperation. Help India and China along when we can rather than seeing themas a threat to our power. Seek to co-opt them as allies, much as Britain did with us during our rise.
12. Having had a strategic awakeningas the result of these steps, America must still try to sell this grand strategy to the world, and practice these principles in all its efforts to shrink the Gap and make golbalization truly global. President Bush pursued security virtually to the exclusion of all else while President Clinton did the same with trade. We need to learn to do both at the same time.
James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council.
Thomas Barnett Series at New Atlanticist:
- America and the World After Bush: A Look Back (Monday, January 19)
- America and the World After Bush: 12 Step Recovery Plan (Tuesday, January 20)
- America and the World After Bush: Diplomacy and Security (Wednesday, January 21)
- America and the World After Bush: Economics and Globalization (Thursday, January 22)
- Great Powers: Reflections (Friday, January 23)
- 5 Questions for Thomas Barnett (Friday, January 23)
Comments
Obviously, I haven't read the book but I'm puzzled. Aren't
and
in direct conflict? Or is he urging us to engage in something he acknowledges is futile?
I think that Tom Barnett doesn't understand what an emergent phenomenon is. For one thing, they're never defined and they're not collective, at least not in the way that term is conventionally defined.
This Barnett guy is a wuss. Why don't we just give up now and give the terrorists the keys to the country. IDIOT!
Dave,
I think he's saying "resistance is futile." He's encouraging us to not only stop trying to stop the forces of globalization but to embrace them and do what we can to help them along.
He's joking, right? All it would take on America's part would be either a slam-down on immigration (both illegal and legal, in the form of heavily tightened border security and a sever restriction on visas) or a significant tariff on all non-NAFTA countries (or both), and the succeeding round of trade barriers and tariffs across the world would destroy globalization in its most prominent form (trade) in a few weeks.
America has enormous power over globalization.
I've noticed elsewhere that this particular point bothers me. It only makes sense if you are planning on getting into more of these types of wars on a large-scale in the future, and Iraq is winding down.
Wouldn't a less unilateral America have avoided going to war with Iraq, leading to the type of manpower-heavy COIN operation that would lead Barnett to demand that the military make a radical shift towards focusing on COIN and "small wars"?
I think he's an idiot, then. They trace terrorist plots in Europe and elsewhere back to the mountain regions of Pakistan in the FATA. Unless you want to give up on the idea of a "war on terror" and focus primarily on intercepting and stopping these guys once they get "in-country" (which is certainly possible - there were a number of opportunities to stop the 9/11 plotters before the 9/11 attacks, had the law enforcement apparatus been arranged as such).
Iraq's a propaganda device, useful for grabbing angry youths in muslim communities from Great Britain and Algeria and directing them to Iraq to be suicide bombers.
Unless you were 1913 Europe.
I actually think it can be quite the opposite. The kind of connectivity and communication we have now is incredibly powerful at creating frustrated expectations (since video footage of more prosperous conditions can be sent into the poorest parts of the world, income inequalities are more visible than ever, and people can gripe with a considerably larger group of people than before).
Just look at history, when the printing press made a common literature and intellectual community much more possible. While it may have played a role in creating "national cultures" and languages, it also helped to harden those differences.
The Brits had no choice. They were heavily weakened by warfare and the preceding economic depression, and faced with a world where it was either throw yourself in with America (and gain the benefits of that, although you have to play second fiddle), try to maintain a fragile independence (which might have been possible, when Great Britain got nukes), or work with the Soviets, which would have meant ceding continental Europe (Great Britain's traditional geopolitical nightmare).
He's joking, right? All it would take on America's part would be either a slam-down on immigration (both illegal and legal, in the form of heavily tightened border security and a sever restriction on visas) or a significant tariff on all non-NAFTA countries (or both), and the succeeding round of trade barriers and tariffs across the world would destroy globalization in its most prominent form (trade) in a few weeks.
Brett, your misinterpreting what Barnett is saying here. He is not saying that we don't have the power to destroy Globalization. In fact, he warns against our seeing China as an enemy and preparing for a future war with them as such a move would destroy globalization dead on its tracks. What he means by saying that we have no control of globalization, read in context in his book, articles, and blog posts is that once unleashed, we have little control of how globalization spreads, where supply and demand go (since in the long run we want it to spread) and hence, we should not try to stop it from proceeding as it must. That is, resit the temptation for protectionism and accept that labor intensive jobs, in a globalized world will go where labor is cheap.
I've noticed elsewhere that this particular point bothers me. It only makes sense if you are planning on getting into more of these types of wars on a large-scale in the future, and Iraq is winding down.
Not really, if you think about it. Over the last 20 yrs the US military has become the unparalleled military power in the world. That is, there is no conventional military power that can resist our Leviathan force, mainly made up of navy, air force and big platform army. This applies for large militaries as well as for smaller militaries like Iraq's under Saddam Hussein. Knowing this, we can expect other countries to have learned the lesson of Iraq. The US did away with the Iraqi military in less than a month, but took almost 6 yrs of intensive fighting to barely control Iraq's militias and insurgent groups. As such, it would make sense for them, if they have reasons to fear US intervention, to plan accordingly and focus on creating insurgency forces capable of disappearing once our Leviathan force shows up, only to begin hitting us hard once an occupation begins.
The reason for creating such a force then is two fold, to be able to deal with counter-insurgencies when we need to, and to avoid being self-deterred from doing so by our inability to fight COIN wars. Why would we need to fight such wars? Well, according to Barnett's theory, as globalization expands, there will surface some entrenched dictators who will oppose its expansion. In this list he originally placed Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong il, and Zimbabwe's Mugabe. His criteria, leaders who disconnected, or sought to disconnect their countries from globalization, and in so doing increased instability in their own regions. When we encounter these obstacles to the spread of globalization, we employ our already instituted international rule set for processing politically bankrupt states (see BluePrint for Action) and go for the take down. The end result being, to leave the state far more connected to the forces of globalization than it was prior to our intervention.
Wouldn't a less unilateral America have avoided going to war with Iraq, leading to the type of manpower-heavy COIN operation that would lead Barnett to demand that the military make a radical shift towards focusing on COIN and "small wars"?
Again, you are not reading Barnett in context. Taking his whole argument as presented in the Pentagon's New Map and BLueprint for action, this means that any future take down will be through an internationally approved rule set for processing politically bankrupt states. However, once you remove the leadership a vaccuum will always ensue, and unless the US demonstrates the capability to deal with this situation, none of our allies will contribute to such a project. Of course, to understand the above, you'd also have to understand and know more about the SysAdmin function as prescribed in his books.
Also, keep in mind that Barnett is not calling for turning the entire US military into a COIN fighting machine. Rather, he sees the military as dividing into two, once focused on the leviathan functions of overwhelming power, and network centric war, while the other focus on the SysAdmin functions of fighting insurgencies, while also doing the nation-building side of reconnecting the state to the globalized world.
I think he's an idiot, then. They trace terrorist plots in Europe and elsewhere back to the mountain regions of Pakistan in the FATA. Unless you want to give up on the idea of a "war on terror" and focus primarily on intercepting and stopping these guys once they get "in-country" (which is certainly possible - there were a number of opportunities to stop the 9/11 plotters before the 9/11 attacks, had the law enforcement apparatus been arranged as such).
Iraq's a propaganda device, useful for grabbing angry youths in muslim communities from Great Britain and Algeria and directing them to Iraq to be suicide bombers.
I disagree with Barnett on Afghanistan. However, it is useful to understand his argument and why he sees Iraq as the more important battlefront. First, for Barnett, al Qaeda and the other insurgencies around the world are not a problem, but rather symptoms of a much larger problem. Hence going after Al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Maghreb or HQ al Qaeda in FATA is only attacking the symptoms, not the disease.
The disease as Barnett sees it, is the lack of connectivity of the regions from where the threats emanate (see his Pentagon's new map) to the rest of the globalized world. Hence his usual catchphrase, disconnectedness defines danger. The more disconnected you are from the global economy, the more of a problem you tend to be to the rest of the world. Before taking on this point, I suggest you look at his map, and read the original article that lead to his first book.
Since disconnectedness is the problem, for Barnett, the most important thing is to connect these regions to the globalized world. As such, you go where you get more bang for your buck. Iraq is close to Saudi Arabia, where Wahabbism was born and where OBL was nurtured. Wahabbism is part of the problem, in its current form and to undermine al Qaeda's ideology you need to attack the source. By connecting Iraq to the global economy, and hence turn it into an economic tiger, you can do more to undermine Islamist ideology and propaganda than by simply eliminating al Qaeda in Pakistan. In short, Iraq becomes an economic juggernaut in the region, it begins integrating other countries near it to globalization, increasing prosperity and opportunity regionally, leading to a marginalization of Islamist ideology which tends to have a lot more to do with the lack of opportunity in these countries, and their closed systems than anything else. In Barnett's theory of the world, the more connectivity you have, the more likely it is you'll eventually follow a path toward democratization. Democratization, however, is not the goal, but rather integration into the global economy, which gives you an interest in preserving the global order. Hence, while al Qaeda hides away and plans its next attack, we are actually attacking it at the source, and hence giving it a much more lethal blow than any of their attacks can do to us.
I actually think it can be quite the opposite. The kind of connectivity and communication we have now is incredibly powerful at creating frustrated expectations (since video footage of more prosperous conditions can be sent into the poorest parts of the world, income inequalities are more visible than ever, and people can gripe with a considerably larger group of people than before).
Just look at history, when the printing press made a common literature and intellectual community much more possible. While it may have played a role in creating "national cultures" and languages, it also helped to harden those differences.
Indeed. That is why Barnett talks about making Globalization truly global. To his mind, the reason connectivity breeds trust which breeds peace is that through continuing trade and other interactions, countries begin seeing each other less as competitors for a specific sized pie, and instead as partners in growing, or baking one, if you prefer. It's part of what he takes from neo-liberalist theory. Economic interconnectivity reduces the likelihood of war, so long as all benefit.
The Brits had no choice. They were heavily weakened by warfare and the preceding economic depression, and faced with a world where it was either throw yourself in with America (and gain the benefits of that, although you have to play second fiddle), try to maintain a fragile independence (which might have been possible, when Great Britain got nukes), or work with the Soviets, which would have meant ceding continental Europe (Great Britain's traditional geopolitical nightmare).
And the day will come when we will no longer have a choice either. China in terms of population and size will likely overtake us in this century. Recognizing that reality Barnett is calling for bringing China in from the cold and making them not only vested in the world order as it stands, and the rule sets that make it possible, but also to make it a guarantor of that order. In short, the project Barnett is calling for is not for American primacy for ever, but rather for the establishment of rule sets that preserve the system in a way that allows all great and small powers to benefit, the end point being ending war as we know it, or what he calls, that future worth creating.
why would everyone need to have that power?!!
That will probably be very expensive, if he's serious about that. I'm suspicious about this because, as James pointed out in a summary of what Barnett said,
Brett,
That will probably be very expensive, if he's serious about that. I'm suspicious about this because, as James pointed out in a summary of what Barnett said....That doesn't sound like a split military to me. It sounds more like he wants to gut modernization in the conventional forces so he can spend more money doing peacekeeping and COIN.
It's not that he wants to gut the modernization of our conventional forces, rather, he thinks that due to modernization our Leviathan-type forces, i.e. Air force, some navy will get smaller, b/c due to our overwhelming technological superiority we'll just need a lot less of them to do the job of taking down regimes.
His formula tends to be, the smaller and faster the Leviathan, the larger the SysAdmin force will be, and the longer it will have to be deployed. That is, the Leviathan force's only purpose is to use its overwhelming military, technological superiority to take down a regime or conventional military, while the Sys Admin is in charge of nation-building and reconnecting a country to the global economy.
Right now, from Barnett's, and may I add Sec Def Robert Gates, we're spending far too much on platforms and future tech toys, and not enough on the ground pounders who are doing most of the heavy lifting. It's gotten better since 2003, but the imbalance is still there. What Barnett argues is that so long as this is the case, our guys will continue to die b/c we're too busy imagining and building a military for a future war with a near peer competitor to buy the tools we need right now.
As for expensive, yeah, at least initially, but the pay off, i.e. being able to efficiently reconnect failed, failing states to the global economy is worth it. Plus, as Barnett sees it, the US shouldn't have to do this alone, and wants us to tap Chinese and Indian manpower for the Sys Admin force. In fact, his formula for the Leviathan is for it to be mostly American, with a smaller no. of allies, while Sys Admin will be mostly international over the long term.
Not every war the US gets into is going to lead to regime change.In addition to that, I think you are inaccurate. China, for example, has put a lot of money into submarines and the like, designed to interdict the US Navy in East Asia if they and the US ever come to blows.
Indeed. However, according to Barnett most of the wars we will fight won't be against other Great Powers (i.e. China), but rather will be fought on the periphery of globalization's advance and in the most disconnected areas of our world. This means, we'll be fighting militarily weaker opponents, who will look to guerrilla warfare as a means of demonstrating that if we try to take them out, they will give us another Iraq. In fact, I think this is one of Barnett's theory's most significant distinctions from others. Due to the expansion of globalization, and the adoption of capitalist rules by China, India, and other powers, not to mention their acquisition of nuclear weapons, he believes that Great Power war has effectively ended. It's a huge part of why he's against the big platform, near peer competitor war crowd, he refers to as Cold Worriers. The other reason is that over the last two decades, since the end of the Cold War, we've been buying one military while fighting wars that required a completely different one. In the Pentagon's New Map, he provides the data to back this up. It's how he came up with the map in the first place. The most Barnett thinks we should have in terms of high end weaponry is just enough to keep the US as the superior military power for a while.
Although China is modernizing its military, it will be a long while before they'll have the capability for power projection that we have. At most, right now, the Chinese are aiming for regional superiority. That's also something Barnett wants us to recognize, and why he thinks we need to lock in China as an ally now, and build up an Asian NATO like entity to deal with many of the common problems we both face in the region.
That's why I pointed out 1913 Europe. In many ways, you had similar economic integration going on (in fact, in volume of trade, the current globalization didn't match the prior one until the 1990s), even greater migration flows than today, and a whole list of technological innovations that made communications much easier and transport much cheaper. Yet 1913 Europe turned into 1914 Europe, which went to war, and all the above fell apart.
Barnett could probably argue that there are differences from now and that period (and I would believe it), but the idea that economic interconnectedness and trade relations will bring peace and decrease the likelihood of war is nonsense, if history is our guide.
Indeed. That's been one of the main criticisms of Barnett's theory and he readily admits that his economic determinism doesn't go down well with some people. However, the big difference that Barnett points to, in regards to 1913, and the 1930s is that all Great Powers now have nuclear weapons, and following the Cold War example, rather than make our world more unstable, nukes brought about the end of Great Power war. The statistical data Barnett presents in PNM demonstrates, according to him, that over the last few decades the incidence of great power war, and even state on state war has actually decreased dramatically, and he attributes this to not only, nukes and economic interconnectedness but also US military power. His theory essentially looks at the future, sees that the US will not be the sole Superpower for long, hence the need for rule sets recognized by all great powers for protecting globalization and ensuring a smooth transition between powers within that system.
Right now, from Barnett's, and may I add Sec Def Robert Gates, we're spending far too much on platforms and future tech toys,
But if Barnett wants to have a smaller Leviathan-style force doing the stuff the bigger force does now, he's going to need those high-priced tech toys, like the F-22 (which are a step above the F-16), new ships, and the aircraft carriers. Admittedly, some modifications are in order (the Future Combat System needs to be re-designed - it is slowly strangling itself at this point).
That's what worries me, to be honest. I think Barnett is under-estimating the importance of these new tech toys.
That's assuming you can. Unless Barnett is calling for the US to openly rule bad territories and failing states like an empire, you have to recognize that these are very complex areas, none of them alike, and there are very real limitations on what you can do to actually stabilize the situation.
Take Africa, for instance. It would probably make more sense to re-draw the borders of some African countries, and possibly even promote population transfer for stability purposes (unless you want to rule it forever).
This is where I disagree with Barnett. The truth is that we fundamentally don't know what the future of so-called "conventional warfare" will be. Nukes help slow it down, but nukes aren't the end-all, be-all on defense - states need a delivery platform for them, and attacking states can target and destroy both the nuclear storage facilities and said means of delivery.
But aside from that, there are several spark points that could turn into a conventional war. What if Taiwan elects another Chen Shui-Ban, only he's more determined to get independence?
But if Barnett wants to have a smaller Leviathan-style force doing the stuff the bigger force does now, he's going to need those high-priced tech toys, like the F-22 (which are a step above the F-16), new ships, and the aircraft carriers. Admittedly, some modifications are in order (the Future Combat System needs to be re-designed - it is slowly strangling itself at this point).
That's just it, Barnett is not talking about doing away with the Leviathan force. In fact, he thinks it essential to his plans. That doesn't mean cutting the upgrades or new platforms completely, just those that aren't necessary. The reason Barnett says the Leviathan force will become smaller, is because our technological advancement will allow us to make it smaller, and yet just as deadly.
That's assuming you can. Unless Barnett is calling for the US to openly rule bad territories and failing states like an empire, you have to recognize that these are very complex areas, none of them alike, and there are very real limitations on what you can do to actually stabilize the situation.
Take Africa, for instance. It would probably make more sense to re-draw the borders of some African countries, and possibly even promote population transfer for stability purposes (unless you want to rule it forever).
Again, the Leviathan force will not be an American force alone, but will draw from those countries that have the bodies to offer, i.e. China, India and Russia, all of whom have economic interests in Gap nations, African nations being the primary example. Just look at how fast China and India sent ships to help in anti-piracy duty off the horn of Africa. Barnett wants to build on these type of relations and ensure that these countries pay for what they are getting, connectivity and resources in areas where the US and Europe have not reached yet. He also does not call for redrawing borders, but rather for more effective peace making and peace keeping, not to mention greater integration along the lines of the OSCE, NATO and eventually the EU.
This is where I disagree with Barnett. The truth is that we fundamentally don't know what the future of so-called "conventional warfare" will be. Nukes help slow it down, but nukes aren't the end-all, be-all on defense - states need a delivery platform for them, and attacking states can target and destroy both the nuclear storage facilities and said means of delivery.
But aside from that, there are several spark points that could turn into a conventional war. What if Taiwan elects another Chen Shui-Ban, only he's more determined to get independence?
Yes, he draws heavily from neo-liberalism and how economic interconnectivity aids in ensuring that great power war becomes obsolete (along with nukes). Yes, miscalculation is a problem, but so long as we understand that China is more of an ally, due to their congruent interests, then things should proceed more smoothly. Talking about them as near peer competitors is a self-fulfilling prophecy, which given the fact they own our debt, is a bad idea. To boot, the Chinese need us, as the present crisis is making clear. Without US demand, the Chinese economy also suffers, making ours a symbiotic relationship. As for Taiwan, N. Korea, that is a primary reason why Barnett calls for making India and China pillars of an Asian NATO, along with the US, thereby providing an avenue for security and economic integration in Asia, with US support and guidance.
Again, the Leviathan force will not be an American force alone, but will draw from those countries that have the bodies to offer, i.e. China, India and Russia, all of whom have economic interests in Gap nations, African nations being the primary example. Just look at how fast China and India sent ships to help in anti-piracy duty off the horn of Africa. Barnett wants to build on these type of relations and ensure that these countries pay for what they are getting, connectivity and resources in areas where the US and Europe have not reached yet. He also does not call for redrawing borders, but rather for more effective peace making and peace keeping, not to mention greater integration along the lines of the OSCE, NATO and eventually the EU.
Sorry, here I meant to write Sys Admin force, not Leviathan. The Leviathan will be largely American, possibly involving a few other countries who can interconnect with our military. The Sys Admin, on the other hand, will be mostly international, and while the US will contribute, it won't be the dominant contributor.
I disagree with Barnett. The truth is that we fundamentally don't know what the future of so-called conventional warfare will be.
Most Certainly, miscalculation is a BIG problem, but so long as we understand that China is more of an ally, due to their congruent interests, then things should proceed much more smoothly.
Why does our goverment not show more respect for China?
I don't like Bush.
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